The Cyber Threat Perspective

Service accounts are one of the easiest paths to domain admin on an internal
pen test, and one of the most neglected accounts in Active Directory.

In this episode, Spencer and Tyler break down why service accounts keep
falling: Kerberoasting every service account (not just the privileged ones),
cracking the hashes offline, and spraying what cracks across the environment.
Tyler shares a recent engagement where a non-administrative service account
shared its password with a domain admin. Same password, one "SVC_" prefix
apart. That spray handed over the domain. He's also seen the built-in RID 500
administrator account used as a service account on three separate engagements
this year.

They also get into where these credentials actually live: web.config files on
open file shares, plaintext password files (present on roughly 90% of their
pen tests), and one .eml attachment with the credentials sitting inside a
screenshot.

Then the fix list, in the order they'd actually do it:

- Inventory the accounts and document where each one is used, before you touch a password
- Delete the service accounts that don't need to exist
- Strip privileges and restrict interactive logon rights
- Get a password vault or PAM solution, and make every password long and unique
- Alert on service accounts logging on interactively
- Move to group managed service accounts (gMSA) where you can
- Enforce 20-25 character minimums in the meantime. They've cracked 20+ character passphrases with a gaming rig, a 180 GB wordlist, and mutation rules producing roughly four quadrillion permutations

Plus the three cleanup mistakes that cause the most damage, including the story
of a $70 billion enterprise where one undocumented password reset turned into a
10-hour troubleshooting call.
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In July 2026, Microsoft alone released 622 CVEs. In the 2010s, the monthly average was about a dozen. Nobody handed IT teams more time, budget, or headcount to match, and that gap is what burnout is actually made of.
Somewhere in the last five to ten years, "keeping the lights on" became "and also prevent cyberattacks." Spencer Alessi and Brad Causey talk through how security landed on IT's plate, why capable admins end up feeling like they're failing, and what to do about it when hiring a dedicated security person isn't on the table.
The core of the episode is a four-question framework for prioritizing when you can't do everything:
- Harm: what would cause the greatest damage to the business?
- Likelihood: what is most likely to actually be attacked?
- Improve: what can you realistically fix with the people and tools you have today?
- Accept: what risk must leadership explicitly own because your team can't address it?
Brad's addition: don't start from the scan report, start from the crown jewels. Client matters if you're a law firm, financial data if you're a bank. From there, draw lines outward to whatever touches them. And executives need to get comfortable accepting risk, because zero risk tolerance isn't a strategy, it's a phrase.
We also get into the language that works with leadership. "You gave me four things and I have time for two" is adversarial and doesn't give anyone enough to decide with. "I recommend A and C, here's why, and here's when B and D land if nothing else gets added" is managing up. Same for new projects: price the work honestly, including cost, timeline, and tradeoffs, then hand the decision back to the people with full business context.
We close with the four things IT teams need to succeed: authority, budget, team, and support, including a trusted outside partner for the specialized work you shouldn't be doing yourself.
Planning your next penetration test? Book a call with us at https://securit360.com
If you enjoyed this episode, please share it with your network. See you next week.
Blog: https://offsec.blog/
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@cyberthreatpov
Twitter: https://x.com/cyberthreatpov
Follow Spencer on social ⬇
Spencer's Links: https://spenceralessi.com
Work with Us: https://securit360.com | Find vulnerabilities that matter, learn about how we do internal pentesting here.

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The OWASP Subtractive Security Top 10 Project --> https://github.com/OWASP/OWASP-Subtractive-Hardening-Top-10
The OWASP Subtractive Security Top 10 Project is an initiative to identify, document, and promote the highest-impact opportunities for reducing cyber risk through the elimination of attack paths.
Blog: https://offsec.blog/
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Follow Spencer on social ⬇
Spencer's Links: https://spenceralessi.com
Work with Us: https://securit360.com | Find vulnerabilities that matter, learn about how we do internal pentesting here.

Two pen testers have spent thousands of hours inside client networks, and the most common failure they see isn't a missing security product — it's an EDR nobody ever tuned.

In this episode, Spencer and Tyler open up the CrowdStrike Falcon console and walk through the specific settings that decide whether your team catches an attack or never sees it. They start with the story that kicked the whole thing off: Tyler running a pen test where every AMSI bypass gets blocked and detections fire left and right, while Spencer runs nearly identical tooling against the same product at another client and the SOC sees nothing all week. Same CrowdStrike. Same version. Different checkboxes.

From there it's a tactical walkthrough of Endpoint Security → Prevention Policies and the settings worth your attention: Enhanced Exploitation Visibility, which unlocks command-line and PowerShell telemetry that Microsoft disables by default; Enhanced DLL Load Visibility for side-loading attacks; WSL2 Visibility, which closes a sandbox threat actors have been using to run Kali tooling under the radar; memory scanning for in-memory C# tradecraft; Office malicious macro removal; file system containment for ransomware over SMB; vulnerable driver protection, the direct mitigation for BYOVD attacks and EDR killers; and cloud-based anomalous process execution for living-off-the-land binaries.

They also cover custom IOA rule groups for blocking unauthorized RMM tools, centralized firewall policy management, device policies for USB control, and a warning on exclusions — especially wildcard paths, which Tyler calls a threat actor's best dream.

The takeaway is simple: you're paying real money for EDR, and default configurations aren't giving you what you paid for. Open your console, work through the settings, test them against an IT pilot group, and enable what fits your environment.

TOPICS COVERED

- Why EDR vendors ship deficient defaults on purpose
- Enhanced Exploitation Visibility and the telemetry gap in PowerShell attacks
- DLL side-loading, WSL2 abuse, and vulnerable driver attacks
- Memory scanning and in-memory tooling detection
- Blocking RMM tools with custom IOA rule groups
- Exclusion hygiene and the wildcard path problem
- Device policies, USB blocking, and insider threat

Sentinel One and Defender for Endpoint are next — let us know what else you want covered.

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Blog: https://offsec.blog/
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@cyberthreatpov
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Follow Spencer on social ⬇
Spencer's Links: https://spenceralessi.com
Work with Us: https://securit360.com | Find vulnerabilities that matter, learn about how we do internal pentesting here.

Most cryptographic findings on your vulnerability report will never be exploited by a real attacker. So why do they keep showing up — and why should you still fix them?

In this episode of the Cyber Threat Perspective, Brad Causey and Jordan Natter break down OWASP Top 10 A04: Cryptographic Failures — the entry they openly call their least favorite on the list. They explain why SWEET32, BEAST, and the other scary-sounding named TLS vulnerabilities almost never translate into real-world compromise, why platforms like Security Scorecard and BitSight inflate their severity anyway, and where genuine cryptographic risk actually lives.

Jordan also walks through a real penetration test finding: a JSON Web Token signed with HS256, an exposed configuration backup sitting on the web server, and the signing secret that turned a standard user into an administrator.

In this episode:

- Why A04 dropped on the OWASP Top 10 without becoming less important
- The difference between exploitable risk, hygiene risk, and brand reputational risk
- An honest take on Security Scorecard and BitSight scores — what they measure, what they miss, and why a perfect score can coexist with a weak password policy and no MFA
- The two halves of A04: data in transit (TLS/HTTPS, integrity, tampering) and data at rest (secure storage of credentials, PII, and payment data)
- What a JWT actually is, and why pen testers love pulling them apart
- Real pen test story: exposed config backup → leaked JWT secret → signature tampering → privilege escalation to admin
- Broken server-side signature validation and other improperly implemented cryptography
- Why MD5 and SHA-1 still show up for password storage 20 years too late — and what to use instead (Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt)
- HSTS, secure renegotiation, and certificate expiration as A04 subcategories
- The coffee shop scenario: the full chain of conditions required to exploit SWEET32 — including roughly 250 GB of captured traffic — and why no one has ever documented it happening in the wild
- Why a decade-plus-old vulnerability in your environment says more about your vulnerability management program than about your crypto
- Quantum computing: how today's theoretical attacks may not stay theoretical

The takeaway: classify your data, choose modern algorithms, retire deprecated protocols, and keep a functioning vulnerability management program. Not because a threat actor is sitting in your local coffee shop waiting to derive your session key — but because leaving decade-old findings in place is a signal about everything else you might be missing.

Next up: OWASP A05, which Brad promises is way cooler than A04.

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Have a topic you want us to cover? Send it our way.
Blog: https://offsec.blog/
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@cyberthreatpov
Twitter: https://x.com/cyberthreatpov
Follow Spencer on social ⬇
Spencer's Links: https://spenceralessi.com
Work with Us: https://securit360.com | Find vulnerabilities that matter, learn about how we do internal pentesting here.