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A Slack Story Podcast

Podcast A Slack Story Podcast
James Sherrett
In 2013, I started as #9 on the Slack team. A Slack Story tells the best stories from the 7 years and 5 jobs that followed. The Podcast is those stories in audi...

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5 of 9
  • Preview releasing Slack
    Slack's Launch Story: From Zero to Promising in Silicon ValleyIn this episode, James Sheret narrates the story of Slack's initial release to the world on August 12, 2013. Facing enormous pressure, the Slack team embarked on a 'burn down' mission to prepare for launch, coordinating through daily calls and task lists. With fewer than 200 users of their free product and zero revenue, they aimed to see if people would overcome the 'suck hump' of product adoption. The episode details their meticulous preparation, including working with PR agencies and investors, focusing on acquiring influential tech blog coverage, and aiming for ambitious goals such as 25,000 site visitors and 200 new teams. The narrative also explores the status-driven nature of Silicon Valley and how Slack leveraged PR and storytelling to make an impact. As their initial goals were met, the team faced the challenge of sustaining their early success and converting signups into active users.00:00 Introduction: The Birth of Slack00:26 The Urgency of Launch01:22 Preparing for Launch Day01:42 The Burn Down List03:42 Preview Release Strategy04:57 Setting Ambitious Goals05:47 Silicon Valley's Royal Court08:37 Executing the PR Campaign10:44 Achieving Initial Success11:53 Reflecting on the Journey This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.slackstory.com
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  • Something We All Work On
    Crafting Slack's Go-to-Market Strategy: Overcoming the 'Suck Hump'Computer says:This episode, based on James Sherrett's recount of Slack's journey, illustrates the challenges and strategies employed to market Slack without traditional promotional tactics.The narrative follows the internal discussions and the creation of the essay 'We Don't Sell Saddles Here' by Stewart Butterfield, emphasizing understanding customer needs and aligning them with Slack’s value. It addresses the 'suck hump' — the initial friction users experience — and explores methods to foster user engagement and adoption. The story also highlights Slack's commitment to transforming workplace communication by shifting user beliefs and behaviors, culminating in the successful launch of their product.00:00 Introduction: The Slack Story00:27 Defining Slack's Marketing Challenge00:56 Core Marketing Ideas and Strategies02:48 Overcoming the 'Suck Hump'05:06 Email as the Enemy07:41 Changing Customer Beliefs and Behaviors12:40 Preparing for Launch This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.slackstory.com
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  • So, what is Slack?
    Before we took the first step to introduce our product, we faced a big problem. How to answer the very first question everyone had: what is Slack?And then, if we got someone interested and keen to learn more, how to answer the immediate next questions: Why should anyone care? Who was Slack for? What did Slack do for them? How did Slack work?Thanks for reading A Slack Story! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.The brainstorming we had done in SF at the f2f on Day 1 felt like good foundational work to me. Some ideas had started to emerge. We started to understand our problem better. But I felt like we still didn’t have a really solid solution for how to position Slack to someone starting with a fresh perspective. How to start from zero?And how could we know if our answers to the question of What is Slack? actually worked?We had a lot riding on whether we could accurately convey the positioning and value proposition. The product could be as amazing as possible but if we couldn’t get people to try it we would have another failure.The stakes were high. Our survival depended on getting our positioning right.Testing variantsTo test our ideas and get some real evidence of whether they worked, we designed a pretty simple scenario. We’d try different options for answering What is Slack? and let people tell us with their actions and feedback if any of our options worked for them.From all the ideas Stewart and I discussed we whittled our options down to 5 different concepts. Then we built 5 different landing pages focused on those concepts. Let’s call each of the 5 options a variant.Each variant of the landing page had its own headline and positioning copy. Each was distinct enough that we felt by testing them we’d have some insight into what was going to work.We’d measure the number of visitors and their conversion to signing up. Then we’d ask some starting questions to gather more information. That was the shape of our plan, very much drawn from principles of lean startup methodology.To get rolling, we offered a simple call to action incentive — get $100 credit for signing up. Then to get some traffic to our variants we used Google AdWords (now Google Ads). Those ads you see on Google in response to your search? Those are AdWords in action. We created some small traffic acquisition campaigns to target broad but topical keywords.We started to send traffic to the landing page variants, in a random order, trying to keep the traffic quality uniform so we didn’t bias any specific variant. We measured each stage of the process — clicks, visits, repeat visits, etc.We got more confident in our process as it ran. We ramped up our traffic acquisition and found our first significant insight — a ceiling to topical keywords. Interesting! A limit existed to how many people we could invite into our process because a limit existed on how many people were doing searches on our topics. That turned out to be a good thing to know.As the traffic started to flow, our informed guesses started to have some tangential proof against them. We started to see more patterns emerge.That’s all pretty abstract, so I thought it would be handy to show the actual 5 variants of the landing pages. They’re below in pretty much their original state.Landing Page 1: Team communicationLanding Page 2: Kill emailLanding Page 3: Better decisionsLanding Page 4: Infinite brainLanding Page 5: Less busyAt the bottom of each variant of the web page was the same call to action.When people completed the email address and company name form above by clicking the Join Now button, we presented a Thank You page. On the Thank You we added a short survey. We figured, these were interested folks who could tell us a lot that we wanted to know. Why not?The survey was optional and provided a small extra incentive ($100 more credits) that only showed up after it was finished. We didn’t want to create pecking pigeons in a Skinner box trying to max out their credits.Then a second Thank You page showed up with the extra $100 credit. Surprise!This let us make a fun joke and set the tone for Slack. We were friendly. We were fun. We were going to be launching with a paid product sometime in the future. But getting in wasn’t a sure thing! So there was a bit of the “line outside the nightclub” effect we were trying to create.So what did we learn?If you just want to skip ahead to the answer, go for it. I’m not here to give you mandatory homework. But we could play a little game.Here is it. If you want to try for a richer experience and to learn a bit more from Slack’s story, scroll back up. Spend a few minutes and make a few notes on your own about what you think worked from the 5 landing page variants above. What was the top performer? The bottom performer? How come?Bonus marks for really considering the copy in the survey and landing page. Each bit of the work above got lots of scrutiny and consideration and I believe offers some good lessons. The results below will keep.In the meantime, here are some options we considered for Slack’s logo at the time. These are to keep you busy or just to encourage you to think about the landing page variants and how they might or might not have worked:Okay, enough stalling.Results of our testsFirst up, people responded pretty well to each of the 5 landing page variants. There were no duds that were much, much worse than the rest and that we could disqualify immediately. Hmm.So maybe our test wasn’t a solid test of differentiation? Or maybe each of our variants had some merit and attractiveness for people? Hmm again.Questions like these are pretty hard to answer even when you have lots of time and money and data. We had limited amounts of each of those resources. We wanted to check our work, get some proof and refine our approach. We couldn’t do deep or long research. This would have to do. We decided not to let perfect be the enemy of good enough.So, the headline results from our landing page variants tests:* Lowest performing was Landing Page 4: Your searchable, infinite brain. I liked the variant and the promise and I could also see why it didn’t work – too abstract to quickly understand and a step or two removed from the core pain we were trying to address. And what was an infinite brain anyway? Weird!* Top performing, by a thin margin, was also the most inflammatory variant, Landing Page 2: Kill 75% of your email in 3 days. It was specific and hit a nerve. It had a tangible promise. It had an enemy (email) that everyone knew and no one loved. It worked to get people to sign up.But if we moved ahead with that Kill Email positioning, where could we actually go with that promise and target?Sure it was great to make an enemy of email and to share that enemy with everyone who had ever used a computer connected to the web. It was great to name our enemy and be willing and ready to take it on. But did we just want to stand as a negative against something? We did not.It also begged the question that if our product was successful and reduced someone’s email by 75%, then what? What state of nirvana had we provided? We wanted to stand for something, not just against something. We wanted to run towards a promise in the future, not away from a pain in the past.Plus, our second place variant scored very similarly and we liked it too — Landing Page 5: Be less busy. The origin of this variant was pretty much verbatim from Stewart, with a few tweaks for brevity and clarity.And spoiler: it ended up being the copy we used on the single-page website we launched for our preview release a few weeks later, on August 12, 2013.What we actually learnedTo dig a bit deeper, with the context of our results, what did we actually learn? We got out of the building. So what?Here are 3 of the things that informed our approach to launching Slack, beyond the simple results we measured on the landing page variants.* Seeking an elusive answer – It proved very hard to satisfactorily answer the question: What is Slack? It was hard at the very outset and it proved consistently hard to answer throughout the company’s history. It’s messaging. It’s a replacement for email. It’s a way of working together. It’s all your tools in one place. It’s a collaboration hub. At the time it was each of those things, and yet it was more than any of them alone.* Going for a feeling – By elevating the positioning from an answer to the questions of What is Slack? to promising a feeling Slack would deliver (Be less busy) we felt like we could appeal to a bigger, unaddressed need in people. Did they want feature X, Y and Z or did they want a feeling of calm control in their work? Intuitively we knew that feelings drove the most value for people. As a side benefit, we could work our way around the What is Slack? question to try to answer a more aspirational question: how does Slack make me feel?* Finding a sweet spot – We definitely worked within the MAYA principle: Most Advanced Yet Acceptable. Our initial target audience were going to be tech nerds and developers like us. We wanted to provide them with a solid dose of a familiar experience they could quickly get started using, mixed with new, advanced features they wanted. “A luxury, once enjoyed, becomes a necessity,” famously noted C Northcote Parkinson, and we wanted Slack to be a necessity.And beyond those 3 things we learned about competition. Our audience knew messaging from consumer chat applications like MSN Messenger, AOL IM and Skype and often used them for work amongst their teams. A few work-oriented messaging apps had started to show up: HipChat and FlowDock and Campfire. Each was fine and they were well adopted by tech nerds, but they seemed somewhat interchangeable.They also positioned themselves almost exclusively through feature lists. Look at all this stuff this product can do! Look at all these specs and feature names! File sharing, mobile apps, etc., etc. We believed very clearly that while we needed features, 90% of the user experience was simple messaging, and making that really amazing made the biggest difference.In addition, we learned about who was (and was not) seeking us. In running the AdWords campaign to find traffic for our variants test, we started to get some tangible experience marketing Slack before we actually had to market Slack. And Google provided incredibly valuable insight into aggregated market intent.It showed us that search volume for keywords around product categories like group chat, business chat and company messaging was pretty much zero. No one was looking for the natural name for our product category. File sharing and file security had some droplets of interest but didn’t fit our product.How about the function Slack might serve? There was search volume around role-specific areas like project management, software development and internal communications, but these were oceans of intent that included role-specific software, consultants for hire, service providers, educators and more. Perhaps our people bobbed about there, but it was too broad for Slack to swim in.Where we thought we fit in, somewhere between the rivers of software collaboration and team communication, also felt too broad. We weren’t agile software providers, though you could certainly use Slack for an agile software methodology.At the time of our launch, a well-trod tactic for startups was to harness existing demand and intent through search engine marketing. Unfortunately, this tactic was not going to work for us. Our market was too broad to accurately target, or too narrow to reach any scale.It could have spelled doom that no one was searching for Slack (or Slack-like products). That certainly struck me at the time. But we chose to think the opposite. No one was searching for Slack (or Slack-like products) because they didn’t yet know a better option existed. We had to show them something better could be possible.We knew from the existing customers already using Slack that they believed something better could be possible. They had actually tried our rough product, after all. Hope existed. And that insight from actual users made me a believer that we could find a market too, despite the evidence that seemed to spell doom. Our customers’ feedback confirmed our faith that how software teams worked together wasn’t a non-existent product category, it was instead an undiscovered product category.And yes, I do mean specifically, “how software teams worked together” because that was the scope of our ambition at the time.Stewart made a guesstimate of all the software teams on earth and sized the market as $100-million. Pretty big, right? If we could capture all those teams as customers, that could create a sizeable business for us. We hoped. We knew so little!So what next? Now we knew our challenge. We knew our positioning. To stand out we had to be different. Perhaps an unorthodox tactic to get the word out? Seems about right.Up next: How horseback riding and software development met, and why we didn’t sell saddles at Slack.Thanks for reading A Slack Story! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.slackstory.com
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  • Missionary vs Mercenary
    The first Slack Vancouver office had no plumbing so we washed our dishes in the bathroom sink. Hot water rarely reached that bathroom so we just boiled water in the office kettle when things got too grungy to wipe clean.Because washing the dishes was such a chore, each of the 3 of us (Stewart, JR and me) had our own set of cutlery that we kept on our respective desks. When one of us got fed up with the state of the office we gathered all the office dishes to be washed. It was an unspoken agreement that suited how we wanted to work.About once a week, in the middle of the afternoon lull, one of us would boil water and spend 10 minutes on the task of washing the office dishes. I can still see Stewart up to his elbows in suds in the bathroom sink while talking with the bank on speaker phone set beside the sink.I had stolen my set of cutlery from a restaurant whose menu featured mainly meatballs. Stewart and I ate lunch there one day. We wanted to get out of the office and have a chat. We had to start making some progress on the marketing tasks that were piling up.As was our usual pattern, we talked about life, current tech news, travel – anything to set the stage and avoid the real thing that was on both of our minds. I liked asking him broader questions and I think he appreciated getting them. It wasn’t all work all the time. It wasn’t all “businessman things.”Chatting more broadly gave his mind a short break, something to interrupt the hamster wheel. But the thing we were avoiding talking about was almost always the current work we were doing and how it was or wasn’t getting done.And in general, Stewart and I hadn’t found ways to work particularly well together when we worked closely together. This came down to the fact that we each wanted control over the work. I tried to obtain that control through process. Stewart held out against the process, or rebelled against it or just generally ignored it. That made for some challenging times.After all, I was a hired gun on a 3-month contract. He was the boss leading the company. Shouldn’t I have known better?Silicon Valley loreThere is a classic bit of Silicon Valley lore that all entrepreneurs are missionaries. It gets repeated because it’s flattering and it also contains some portion of truth.The classic presentation of the Missionary vs Mercenary model comes from John Doerr, the legendary venture capitalist at Kleiner Perkins, who invested in foundational tech companies like Netscape, Amazon, Intuit and Google — an amazing track record. He may have a pretty low profile in the general public but to anyone with a passing interest in the societal and commercial impact of technology, John Doerr is Silicon Valley royalty. Whole books have quite rightly been written about him, and by him.In Doerr’s 2007 presentation to the Stanford School of Business entitled Entrepreneurs are Missionaries, he outlines his model for thinking about founders in Silicon Valley.“…an entrepreneur does more than anyone thinks possible with less than anyone thinks possible, in whatever field they're working in, and importantly, at least for my values and those of my partners, entrepreneurs are not mercenaries. They're missionaries.”…“More differences between the mercenaries and the missionaries? Well, the mercenaries are opportunistic, always interested in the pitch and the deal and they're kind of sprinting for the short run. As opposed to the missionaries, who are much more strategic. They're focused on the really big idea – in forming a partnership that will last and they know that this business of innovating is something that takes a long time. They look at it more as a marathon.The mercenary is obsessed on the competition. They create a kind of aristocracy of the founders. They're not inclusive of the rest of a team, and they're really driven by their financial statements. As opposed to their mission and value statements, for example. Or obsessing on the customers.”The model proposed by Doerr is a classic duality. Either you’re a missionary or a mercenary. It’s black or white. Hot or cold. Left or right. You need to choose your approach (or have the approach choose you). The two approaches are in opposition to each other. The missionary is the hero.Being a MercenaryWhen I started at Slack I was a consultant trying to prove my worth. I had a 3-month contract to do. So, pretty clearly, I was a mercenary — a professional hired to do a job.Stewart was the CEO trying to balance so many things at once, one of which was managing me, this damned marketing consultant with my questions, my ideas, my demands. As I was coming to learn, he cared so much about everything he had to do. All those “businessman things” he talked about. He knew he had to do them and he wanted them done his way, particularly any kind of public facing communication. Yes, dear reader, it would be safe to say that Stewart angled towards the missionary side of the duality.So there were many days for me that I would characterize as wandering days — days spent wondering what I should do or could do to get the work done that I had been hired to do. It obviously needed to get done. I obviously had been hired to do it. I obviously also needed Stewart participating and onboard with my work. He had done all the marketing before I’d been hired and wanted to be deeply involved in any new marketing. And yet.Sure, I found many things to work on in the meantime. There was no shortage of tasks that I could do. I knew how to do consultant work about process and preparation and describing the problem and proposing approaches. Not actual work. Work about prospective work and around existing work.But my recollection of those early days at Slack is largely waiting for Stewart and waiting to get down to doing the real work I had been hired to do. I think it’s safe to say I was not a great mercenary.The fate of meatballsThe meatball restaurant we visited went out of business or became something new before we could return. But on that one particular day we visited, alone on that particular patio, after we had gotten through our small talk, I remember eating meatballs and caesar salad with Stewart, and finding that we were in sync.Perhaps we’d found a third way to bridge the divide between missionary and mercenary? Time would tell. I knew somehow I had to find a new way of working with him. So I was trying new things.And it helped that by then I had some familiarity with Slack because I had been using it for hours every day. I started to see the really compelling parts of what it could offer to prospective customers. Stewart and I shared articles back and forth on ways of launching, ways of thinking about products. We had ideas we bounced off each other. We started to build a shared topography of what we could do and where we wanted to go. We started working well together.And pretty quickly I realized we weren’t alone. We had customers. People that we knew and who turned out to really like to use Slack, once they started to use it. We started to hear back from friends and contacts we’d coerced into using Slack. They had tons of suggestions on how to improve the product, and that proved perfect. It meant they used the product and liked it enough to speak up. They were engaged. They had complaints and feedback and it felt glorious, even if they only numbered in the dozens, maybe the hundreds at the time. Despite the missing features or clunky bits, real people were using Slack and kept using Slack once they got started.The problem was the level of coercions needed to get them started. These were the warmest prospective customers we would ever find, and it still was really hard to get them started. To compound our problem, it took multiple people to get started on Slack at the same time for it to work. As we said internally at the time, the single-player experience sucked.So we had both the cold start problem (why would I use this if there’s nothing in here to use it with?) and the multi-user problem (who would I use this with if the people I communicate with aren’t on it?). There was a huge amount of friction to get people to begin using Slack and to get their teams using it. They had email. They had chat. They had file sharing. Another tool could be the answer?But even before that, before we could ask people to use the product and get their teammates using the product, we had a positioning problem. The key problem I’ve mentioned before: what the heck was Slack? It wasn’t email. It wasn’t file sharing. It wasn’t project management software or help desk or task management.All these crowded software categories existed and bulged with competitors. But we didn’t want to get slotted into those categories. It was like restaurants. Categories existed: pizza, sushi, quick service, casual family. Meatballs? We definitely didn’t want to be a failed meatball restaurant.Our goal was something both smaller and bigger. Smaller, in that Slack needed to start out and compliment all the other software people were already using. Bigger, in that we wanted to create a whole new category of software and a better way for teams to work together.So how do you tell people about something new that’s small and big at once? That’s new and familiar? That’s incremental to what they use but then replaces much of the functionality of those tools? How could we give people some compelling story that they could describe to someone else, and that made them look good, and got them to try our product, with all (or at least the majority) of their teammates?We didn’t know any of those answers, yet. But we knew we had to find out or we were sunk before we’d launched. Our survival hinged on getting our story right.In many ways, though we didn’t talk about it at the time, Slack had inherited the Glitch problem – a great experience once you experienced it, but an experience that didn’t fit into any of the existing containers in your brain.Over meatballs on that restaurant patio, Stewart and I didn’t necessarily know the answer to the key questions, What is Slack? We had clues and ideas and needed proof outside of our collective brain space. We needed a way to learn which of our stories would work best, and we needed some proof. We needed to “get out of the building,” as Steve Blank says in Four Steps to the Epiphany.So we came up with a way to test a bunch of positioning options and get some proof: landing pages. We’d trial our ideas away from the warmest prospective customers with the coldest ones — random people on the web.How did we do it and what did those landing page look like and how did they perform? We’ll dig into all that in the next chapter.MenschyAs a sidenote here, I wanted to unpack a bit more an idea I’ll come back to a few times later in this project.Remember how I hinted at a third way of working in a startup? Not mercenary, not missionary, but something else? It’s an idea I’ve thought about a lot since my time at Slack, since I’ve had a chance to reflect on the bigger picture and how my roles fit in over the years.And I’ve come to think there is a third way to be that I would call “menschy,” derivative of the yiddish word mensch — “an honourable person.” It’s the best word I’ve found so far to describe the best version of the role I had a chance to play.Not a missionary. Not a mercenary. A mensch. I don’t want to dress this concept up too much or be too self aggrandizing about it, but it’s the most apt way to describe the approach that worked best. When I did my best work and when that worked served people best, I lived up to a menschy approach.What I had to do — and what I think anyone in any situation of high uncertainty and high pressure needs to do — was find the work that needed to get done and do it as well as I could. It was to help other people — teammates, customers, prospects. It was to live up to the descriptors of a mensch — strength, integrity and honour or compassion. It was to be human and humane. That’s what I aspired to.I wasn’t a founder. I couldn’t be a missionary. I’d joined 8 others at Slack who had all been part of the Glitch failure. That experience tempered and dedicated and bonded them to each other and to the larger mission of Slack.And I also wasn’t a hired gun. Or, at least I didn’t want to be, though that was mostly my role to play at the time. Mercenary values didn’t feel right. I wasn’t going to go on to be a marketing consultant at other startups. I wasn’t looking for the highest bidder. I wanted to belong at Slack and really commit to making it be as good as it could be.But I found I needed to add elements of both missionary and mercenary into my approach to make it work. I needed to have the dedication and purpose of a missionary. I needed to have the clear headedness and bloody mindedness of a mercenary. I needed to have a focus on a mission. I needed to deliver concrete results. I needed to hold on tightly. I needed to let go lightly.I didn’t have the word menschy in the early days of Slack that I’m describing in this chapter. But I did have the feeling that I needed to find a better way to work with Stewart, and to work with the Slack team. I needed to serve the mission of the company and I needed to deliver on the goals of my contract. Was I able to balance those opposite demands?That’s something to cover in the next chapter, where we get down to doing some of the actual work.Up next week:So, what is Slack?Knowing we didn’t know. Creating 5 options to answer the question. Learning about each option. The MAYA principle. Finding our tone and market. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.slackstory.com
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  • Day 1: Vancouver
    Stewart was running late. Either that, or I was at the wrong address. I checked the email: 1140 Homer Street, a glass door between a bar that was closed and the entrance to the courtyard of a high-end restaurant.Inside the glass door, I could see carpeted stairs running up to a second floor. The neighbourhood was called Yaletown and consisted of a few square blocks of renovated warehouses and narrow streets – exposed bricks, thick wooden posts and beams.A hundred years ago it had been a train yard. Now its street level was full of bars, restaurants, hair salons, boutiques and pet boutiques. Its upper floors housed video game programmers, search engine optimization consultancies and local branch plants for Sony and Amazon and Apple. Surrounding the renovated warehouses towered glass-skinned, concrete-cored condos.When people visited Vancouver fashionably, this was the neighbourhood they often started their visits in.Stewart appeared along the sidewalk, in conversation on his phone. He opened the glass door and I followed him up the stairs along a carpeted corridor to the back of the building to a door with a Tiny Speck logo: 250B.The office was about 20’ x 20’, a room with brick walls and large windows facing south. A model of a white galleon hung from the ceiling and turned out to be a kite. A mounted walrus head hung on the wall. A crocheted circle hung in the corner and read in pink stitching, B***h don’t kill my vibe.One other person sat in the office with headphones on, typing at a computer, looking focused. Stewart placed his bag on the desk in the corner and sat on an office chair with a padded cross for a backrest. The other person in the office took off his headphones and introduced himself: “Hey, I’m JR.”Working with StewartJR pointed me to the two empty desks and told me to take my pick. I set myself up and pretended for a few minutes to be getting started.Actually, I was waiting for Stewart to get off his call. When he showed no sign of wrapping up I figured I might as well get started. I’d written a proposal for the work I was going to do. I should assume I had been right with that direction and get started doing it.And that experience — waiting, trying to get on with the work as well as I could, checking in again — was what working with Stewart was like for the most part in those early days. He had very specific guidance to impart on everything, when he became available to impart it.I would like to say it was easy. He was obviously incredibly bright and capable. I would like to say it was fun. We were doing hard work on great problems. But the general theme of my early days I recall as mainly a search to find direction. Stewart was super busy and direction was scarce.Often times, when I was trying to get feedback from him, waiting for feedback from him or looking to book time with him, he’d deflect the requests. “Businessman things,” he once said to me as he shrugged, getting off a call and coming to chat. That became our shorthand for all the other things that occupied him: businessman things.I had to just keep working on my jobs, do my best with my own judgement and wait.First Steps to the EpiphanyWhen I felt stuck on what to do next, I often went back to a book written by Steve Blank called Four Steps to the Epiphany.I had a dog-eared copy full of notes that I found really useful for structure and process at the early stages of a startup where we found ourselves. Four Steps was useful for structure because Blank had founded and built many huge B2B software companies, and the book reflected an idealized view of how he’d done it.I’d used the tactics of the book before with good results, and we were definitely still on the first step of the four: Customer Discovery. Here’s the flow chart of the process of Customer Discovery.The main point of all these boxes is that you need to “get out of the building,” as Blank says. And talk to customers. Test things with them. Listen.Other times when I needed guidance on the next thing to work on I’d just put on my own businessman hat and ask: what is the next best thing for me to be doing? Or, what is the thing that the business needs me to do? I found it an effective way to get out of my own head, and any frustrations I might be having, to focus on keeping moving ahead. I wished I’d done it more when I had run my own startup.As a result of waiting and asking what needed to be done, I ended up doing a lot of different things — researching the market, drafting positioning documents, writing website copy. Basically, trying to keep pushing to answer the key question I felt like we needed to answer – What is Slack?This wasn’t a smooth process. I found many dead ends and I was basically trying to catch up to Stewart. Looking back, I’m sure I have some Stockholm syndrome in my recall, and some survivorship bias in my recollections. (Was it really that bad or just a circuitous way to find the right direction?) But I did learn quickly through taking initiative and either rarely making headway or commonly making mistakes. This didn’t always please my boss, but I think it did show myself and my peers that I was committed and contributing.And to be honest, in those early days, I really had no sense of what was to come with Slack. The whole operation struck me as held together with bailing twine, dedication and gumption. The team was obviously talented and committed to each other and believed in the promise of their new product.But I wondered: what had I gotten myself into? I had conversations in the evening with my wife about just that question and the natural follow up: where could this possibly be going? It was not clear at all Slack was headed to any success.In my job search before agreeing to join Slack I had been close to joining other companies: a well-funded and growing software suite for lawyers called Clio, a social media monitoring company called Hootsuite. They were each prospectively offering me more money and a more mature company, further along in its product development. What, my wife rightly wondered, was the reason to join this failed game company and bet on their new, unproven, weird product called Slack?I didn’t really have a good, coherent, well reasoned answer. But the main two things that made Slack compelling at the time were the team and the culture.Team and cultureThe reason the team was compelling is easy to unpack. They were simply way better than any team I had worked with before. They were more accomplished. They worked harder. They were smarter. They were faster. They were deeply online people who had been using the Internet and working on the web through the late 1990s and early 2000s and had extensive expertise in how it worked both technically as well as socially. They also really seemed to like each other and had terrific chemistry.And to unpack the chemistry is really to unpack the culture. Here were people who shared the same values: fun, work, ambition, a collision of high and low brow references, an appreciation for going to the nth degree to get something just right.They were each mildly weird and unbalanced in their own ways and happy being weird and unbalanced together. An element of fun and humour underpinned everything they did. The tone was serious and light, demanding and humane, focused and wandering, all at once. We posted a sign above the door of our modest office that became a call to ambition: More Holey Moley.Standards for work were set really high and I responded well to that. Here were people who produced great work and could also recognize great work across domains. Here too was as close as I had come to a meritocratic culture for everyone. I realized I could make copy editing suggestions to Stewart on a piece of writing he’d sweated over, but only if my suggestions were all really well considered, packaged up in an accessible format and actually improved the end product. Praise, when it rarely came, was well earned. There were no workplace equivalents of participation medals.(Many years later I found myself telling a group of executives I was leading on a tour of Slack’s 10-storey headquarters in San Francisco that the company had always been a liberal arts software company. When puzzled about something not working, no one felt embarrassed quoting Wittgenstein (“It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.”) right beside Homer Simpson ("The lesson is: never try.”). No one had to be convinced that people made decisions based on some concoction of emotion and reason, that artistry mattered as much as technical acumen. No one talked about “soft skills” as if they were on the Nice to Haves list for employees.)And the culture of Slack came alive in its strongest way for me in those early days in written words, and how written words were evolving. The team really used their own product all day and every day, and beyond into the evenings. Everything was in Slack, organized into channels that acted as streams of communications and events and emotions and jokes.As JR himself, my first Vancouver teammate beyond Stewart, wrote in The death of Glitch and Birth of Slack:When I joined the company, I’d been given a crash course in how we worked together on my first day. No email. Everything happened in IRC: a chat protocol from the late 80s. We had a server set up with channels based on topics of discussion: #general for company-wide chat, #deploys for new code releases, #support-hose for inbound customer support requests, and so on.Alongside this we added a few other things we needed. A simple FTP server which posted uploads into the #files channel. A system that wrote our chat logs to a database so we could search them and read old archives.A set of integrations that posted updates from other systems into IRC: whenever a new user signed up for Glitch, or bought credits, or wrote in for support, it showed up in a channel. Whenever we deployed code, or got a new review on the App Store, or tweeted from our Twitter account, it showed up in a channel.Taken together, this allowed us to communicate in real-time, share files, find anything we’d ever talked about at the company, and keep track of everything happening with the business – all while avoiding the unique 21st-century hell of email reply chains and fragmented organizational knowledge.This was the experience I had too, and so many other early Slack employees had. They were both new to the company and the way it worked.At first if felt disorienting and overwhelming. Then quickly the work streams became indispensable and I started dreaming in channels. I couldn’t imagine using anything else.Channels were themed based on the work happening in the company. Anyone could jump into any channel and any conversation in any channel. This was incredibly powerful because you could read and join in any work stream. It was also an incredible responsibility because you could disrupt or derail any work stream.For us, the channel was the canonical work stream. If something wasn’t in a channel it might as well not exist. Messages from humans and computers mingled together in channels because both were essential to the work. We quoted these messages. We quoted each other. We learned to do Slack as we were doing it. As a result, a style of writing emerged combining the best aspects of each of our individual writings. As I watched and participated, an aesthetic spread.That’s a bit abstract, so here are some examples.The parenthetical voice became common because we relied on writing so much that we had to accommodate and show different perspectives at once. Not including the parenthetical in an important message felt like you were making an argument but not showing your work (and I may be totally wrong here but I think it made the whole reliance-on-writing culture possible because it counterpointed and disarmed arguments and objections as well as me vs you arguments). Including the parenthetical made explicit that you had done more work than shown, and were open to other perspectives.Searching became an expected default behaviour so that people would try to self serve their own questions. Having access to the entire history of communication of the company meant you had a responsibility to use that history. When you had a question, you learned that it was pretty unlikely to be the first time that question had ever come up. So the rule was: seek to solve first through search. Only ask for help, and tax a teammate to answer, if you couldn’t answer for yourself, or had searched and found a partial answer and wanted to confirm it or clarify.Emojis were simply a more efficient way of acknowledging someone and providing an emotive response than writing. Plus, they were like a game too. Could you come up with a clever emoji that acted as a commentary such as 💸 when you were busy buying ads? Could you complete a 👉 👈 with a teammate in consecutive messages, like a texted high five?Often times, we quoted things to make sure our messages were clear. (Did you mean when you said .)We worked at mastering the simple markup syntax in Slack that let us decorate our text for meaning and to show off. We learned keyboard shortcuts to emphasize words, arrange text and build lists. To be any good at Slack the company you had to be good at Slack the product.Playing the Slack gameWhen people on the team were going for lunch or getting up to do an errand they would type ‘afk 30 mins’ — meaning, away from keyboard for 30 minutes — to let teammates know they would be out or reach for half an hour. To some folks this small gesture might seem trivial or even nagging. But I found it rather charming.Here was a team very tightly connected who consistently offered up small signals of belonging and courtesy to each other. ‘afk’ meant more than just ‘I’ll be away from my keyboard for a period of time.’ I read it was meaning ‘You may need me in the next 30 minutes and I won’t be available but I will be thereafter’ and ‘Here are some expectations I can share with you as a small sign of caring’ and even ‘I trust you to tell you what I’m doing and to provide transparency to you.’No one mandated that we had to type ‘afk’ if we were going to be offline or unreachable. Like all great group rituals, one person started it, another saw it and imitated it, and then it became normalized as a small courtesy. It started before I arrived and I’d guess carried over into Slack from IRC.Other chat acronyms also populated our communication — OTOH (On The Other Hand), IMHO (In My Humble Opinion) or just IMO (In My Opinion) and YMMV (Your Mileage May Vary) — as ways to humanize and soften messages. But it was afk that struck me as most representative of the type of place Slack could be.Years later, as the company added new employees at a blistering pace, an official Slack style guide was written and included in training. New employees otherwise tended to be a bit mystified at first and hesitant to jump in to such a fast mode of working. Open felt exposing to them. Transparency felt threatening. What if they made a mistake?But that was still many years away, and we had to sink or swim for ourselves in the meantime. We were still very much in Customer Discovery and hadn’t even considered Step 2: Customer Validation.In short, right from Day 1, I found these Slack folks were people who read and wrote and created things in the world and loved to do so. I felt like I wanted to be one of those people rather than someone selling lawyers on revision management. I wanted to belong. These felt like what I hoped could be my people.Up next week:Missionary vs mercenaryHow to answer the key question — What is Slack? Finding a role. The missionary vs mercenary continuum. Meatball restaurants don’t last.NotesFour Steps to the Epiphany is also available as a PDF from Stanford. It’s still a terrific resources for anyone considering or running a startup. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.slackstory.com
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About A Slack Story Podcast

In 2013, I started as #9 on the Slack team. A Slack Story tells the best stories from the 7 years and 5 jobs that followed. The Podcast is those stories in audio form. Plus more to come. Subscribe by RSS with this link: https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/3721181.rss www.slackstory.com
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