Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

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 First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend ment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing. 
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In Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s congressional map (SB8), which created an additional majority-Black district, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its design without a sufficient justification. The Court clarified that while compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can qualify as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, §2 properly interpreted only requires proof of intentional discrimination—not mere disparate impact—and thus did not require Louisiana to add another majority-minority district. The Court revised the Thornburg v. Gingles framework to align with that interpretation, requiring plaintiffs to show race—not partisanship—drives voting patterns and to produce illustrative maps that satisfy all legitimate state districting goals without relying on race. Applying this updated framework, the Court found the earlier Robinson plaintiffs failed to establish a §2 violation, so Louisiana lacked a compelling interest to use race in drawing SB8, leading the Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling that the map violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
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 Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is non jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable toll ing. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdic tional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdic tional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling

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Totality of the Circumstances is required in considering Probable Cause for a temporary stop. Probable Cause being defined as: "Articulable reasonable suspicion for the officers belief that 'criminal activity is afoot.'"

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A U.S. Army specialist injured while stopping a Taliban suicide bomber at a base in Afghanistan sued military contractor Fluor Corporation for negligence after the attacker—an Afghan hired under the military’s “Afghan First” program—was allegedly poorly supervised. Lower courts dismissed the case, holding that state-law claims against contractors are preempted during wartime under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception. The Supreme Court rejected that view, ruling that the claims are not preempted because neither the Constitution nor federal statutes bar them, and the FTCA exception does not extend to contractors. Relying on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. was misplaced, the Court explained, because preemption applies only where a contractor follows specific government directives, not where it allegedly violates them. Since Fluor’s conduct was neither ordered nor authorized by the military—and resolving the case would not second-guess military decisions—there is no significant conflict with federal interests, and traditional state tort law may proceed.