Practical Stoicism

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I pull heavily from Leonidas Konstantakos' "Stoicism and Just War Theory" doctoral dissertation in this episode. I encourage you to download it and read it yourself: ⁠https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/record/13724⁠

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In this episode, I take up a difficult question: can war ever be just in Stoicism? Not justified. Not strategically useful. Not legal. But truly just — meaning virtuous and right.

I begin by setting aside the two dominant modern frameworks for thinking about war: utilitarianism and deontology. Utilitarianism evaluates war based on consequences. If enough good results from it, the war can be defended. Deontology evaluates war based on rules. Some actions are always wrong, regardless of outcomes. Stoicism does neither.

Using the firebombing of Dresden and the ticking time bomb scenario, I explain how the Stoic approach shifts the focus away from body counts and legal rules and onto character. For the Stoic, external outcomes — even death and destruction — are morally indifferent. What matters is the internal condition of the agents making decisions. Are they acting from justice, courage, and wisdom? Or from fear, ambition, pride, or the desire to dominate?

Drawing on Cicero’s On Duties and later Stoic interpretation, I outline the core criteria: right intention, proper authority, discrimination, and war as a last resort aimed at peace. A war undertaken from a corrupted value structure — where victory is treated as a good in itself — reflects vice. A war undertaken from rational concern for preserving the cosmopolis, after all other paths have been exhausted, may be just.

I also address torture and why the Stoic rejects it, not because of rule-following or cost-benefit calculations, but because it corrupts the agent. It reflects disordered judgment and a failure of oikeiôsis — a failure to recognize another rational being as part of the same moral community. Stoicism is not rule-based. It is character-based.

I then turn to the present. We cannot fully know the internal motives of national leaders. We can only infer. War may be just or unjust depending on the reasoning behind it. That reasoning is ultimately visible only to the agent and their daimon — their inner rational faculty.

Finally, I bring the question home. Most of us are not heads of state. But the Stoic framework for just war is simply Stoic ethics scaled up. The same question applies in everyday conflict: am I acting from virtue, or from ego and fear? The work of the prokoptôn is constant self-examination, especially when stakes are high.

War can be just in Stoicism. But only if it is conducted by people whose souls are ordered toward peace, whose intentions are clean, and whose reason has honestly left them no alternative.

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Details can be found here: https://gofund.me/8068b7ab0

The story is that my brother, Brian, was out with his friends ice fishing in Maine. He left on his snowmobile to get more bait, or supplies or something, and he hit a pressure pocket (that's how it was describe to me) on the lake and it sent him flying. His helmet came off, he smacked the ice pretty violently, he's broken his neck, a bunch of bones in his chest and abdomen, and a lot of bones in his face.

He's been unconscious and in critical care since this past Friday. My understanding is that today he's semi conscious and he's got 6-months to a year of rehab work ahead of him.

My brother is a sign manufacturer, his wife is a nurse. They are not a wealthy family and financial help with medical bills would be something of a godsend.

If you can afford to give, please do.

If you can only afford to share the GoFundMe link, please do.

Thanks, Prokoptôns.
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I am a public philosopher. I am enabled to do this job, in large part, thanks to support from my listeners and readers. You can support my work, and keep it independent and online, at https://stoicismpod.com/members

In this episode, I respond to a short clip discussing incest as an example of emotivism in meta-ethics. Emotivism claims that when we say something is wrong, we are not stating a fact but expressing disapproval. The suggestion in the clip is that incest may ultimately be “wrong” only because we feel that it is wrong.

I take that seriously. It is true that many people struggle to articulate why incest is objectively wrong beyond saying it feels disgusting. And philosophers should care about that. If something is wrong, we should be able to explain why in rational terms.

Using Stoic role ethics, I outline a clear argument. In Stoicism, some roles are grounded in nature. These roles are not arbitrary. They come with built-in functions and ends. The sibling role is ordered toward familial care, trust, and cooperative development within the household. It is explicitly non-erotic because its function is to stabilize kinship bonds. The lover role, by contrast, is ordered toward erotic partnership and exclusivity.

When a person attempts to merge these roles, they introduce incompatible aims into a single relationship. Stoic role ethics holds that voluntarily chosen roles must not contradict natural ones. If they do, one role must be abandoned. Because the sibling role is grounded in nature, it cannot be abandoned without corrupting its function. Adopting the lover role toward a sibling therefore represents a rational error. It makes both roles impossible to fulfil properly.

This means the wrongness is not based on disgust. It is based on contradiction within the structure of human roles and the failure to live coherently within them. Stoicism does not reduce morality to feeling. It grounds moral judgment in reason, nature, and the proper fulfilment of roles within the human community.

I also explain why this matters more broadly. If moral claims are reduced to preference or emotion, then they shift with culture, fashion, or mood. Stoicism resists that instability by anchoring ethics in a rational framework. That framework may be debated, refined, or defended, but it is not merely expressive.

The point is simple: saying something “feels wrong” is not the same as explaining why it must be wrong. Philosophy should move us from reaction to reason.

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I answer questions from a classroom of children about Stoicism and "the old times, when I was a kid."

Please enjoy this special edition.
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I am a public philosopher, it is my only job. I am enabled to do this job, in large part, thanks to support from my listeners and readers. You can support my work, keep it independent and online, at https://stoicismpod.com/members

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In this episode, I take up a question that seems settled, orthodox, and uncontroversial: can indifferents be preferred or dispreferred? Most Stoics would say yes and move on. But there is a serious ancient challenge to that position, and understanding it matters more than most people realize.

I begin with the standard Stoic account, drawing on Zeno as recorded by Stobaeus and Cicero. Virtue alone is good, vice alone is bad, and everything else is indifferent. Still, some indifferents are naturally preferred or rejected because they align with our rational nature. Health, social cooperation, and material sufficiency are not goods, but they are “according to nature.”

I then introduce the provocateur: Ariston of Chios. Ariston rejects the very idea of preferred and dispreferred indifferents. In his view, calling something a preferred indifferent is just calling it a good under another name. For Ariston, everything between virtue and vice is radically neutral, and any preference only arises situationally, never because the thing itself has standing within nature.

I explain why this disagreement is not merely semantic. Ariston’s position is inseparable from his rejection of Stoic physics and logic. Once those are removed, there is no rational structure of nature to ground stable preferences. Ethics collapses into a stark minimalism where virtue alone matters and everything else is interchangeable depending on circumstance.

This is why later Stoics saw Ariston as a dead end rather than a reformer. Without physics and logic, Stoic ethics loses its ability to guide action across time, roles, and recurring human situations. The philosophy becomes thinner, not sharper.

Finally, I connect this ancient dispute to a modern problem. Contemporary Stoicism often tries to keep the ethics while quietly discarding the physics and logic as unnecessary or outdated. That move repeats Ariston’s mistake. Stoicism can evolve, but it cannot survive if its foundations are simply removed without replacement. You cannot pull the columns out from under the Stoa and expect the roof to hold.

If we want Stoicism to remain coherent, actionable, and philosophically serious, we need to understand why preferred indifferents exist and what architectural commitments make them possible in the first place.

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