Thoughts on the Market

A supply-driven oil shock may start with inflation, but Morgan Stanley’s Senior Global Economist Rajeev Sibal discusses why investors need to understand the second-order hit to growth, policy and markets.
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Rajeev Sibal: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Rajeev Sibal, Senior Global Economist at Morgan Stanley.
Today, economic risk from an oil shock isn't the price of oil itself – but really what happens next?
It's Tuesday, April 7th at 3pm in Dubai.
An oil shock doesn't stop at the gas pump. It ripples through inflation, growth, central bank policy, and ultimately markets. As you've heard from my colleagues over the past several weeks, this time may be different. We're not just dealing with a temporary price spike. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is historically unprecedented. We're well over a month now, and we're looking at the implication of a supply shock that could last many quarters. This could evolve into something far more complex.
This is a tricky mix of rising inflation and slowing growth, and the sequence matters greatly. At Morgan Stanley, a collaboration between the economists and the strategists globally looked at a wide range of scenarios of where oil prices may go.
If the Strait of Hormuz were to reopen rapidly, we would see oil prices probably decline rather quickly. That doesn't mean that the problems from the oil shock are going to go away very quickly. But it does mean that the price of oil may move down more quickly. Conversely, if we see a complete closure and an escalation in the conflict, the oil price is probably going to go much, much higher. And in a world where oil moves past $125, which is usually the level at which demand starts to destruct in the economy, i.e. people have to reduce their consumption of oil because of the price, we would see a much more dramatic impact in the global economy.
Right now, we're in the in-between scenario. We see oil hovering between $100 and $125 for a number of weeks now, and this creates a lot of questions and confusions and modeling problems for many central banks. I want to go through some of the key regions of the world to talk about how they are reacting to what is happening right now.
Asia is a little bit unusual. Asia is the most exposed to what's happening in the Middle East. Most oil and gas that leaves the Middle East goes to Asia in terms of physical volumes. The challenge is that many Asian economies have huge buffers in place or reserves. They also use fiscal policy to help subsidize and smooth the price of oil so that the consumer does not experience the shocks as dramatically as they would otherwise.
As a result, there is a mix of countries in Asia that are grappling with figuring out how much support they should continue to provide but also making sure they have physical volumes in place because of the closure. This creates a rather mixed effect from central bank policy and a mixed effect from inflation and growth. In some economies, you're seeing prices move very rapidly and growth being affected very rapidly, whereas in other economies it's been delayed. We expect this mix to continue for the next few quarters.
The euro area is a contrast to Asia because in the euro area inflation passes through very quickly. Historically, inflation reacts not only at the headline level, but also at core. As a result of this, the ECB has indicated that they are likely to raise interest rates in the near future because they don't want inflation expectations to become unanchored. They're more concerned about the speed of inflation than the growth risk right now.
This is a big contrast to the Federal Reserve. In the United States, actually, oil supply shocks do not move core inflation as much as they do in many other regions of the world. The effect is on headline inflation and on consumption, but not necessarily on core inflation.
We have to remember; the U.S. is primarily a services-based economy. As a result, the Fed is more likely to look through the effects of the supply shock and be focused on growth simply because the core inflation pass through is far less than it is in many other economies. As a result, the Fed is thinking more about the growth risks from higher prices of the pump than they are about the price risks – and what that transmission means to inflation in the United States.
This is a big contrast to many other regions in the world, but I think the important thing to remember is that in every economy, in every region, there's a different reaction. Inflation will always lead in terms of oil supply shocks with growth following. But the way that that passes through in each domestic economy is very different. And that means that central banks have to react differently. It also means that potentially, if this lasts for a couple more quarters, fiscal policy will also react differently.
The challenge for market participants, economists, and strategists will be figuring out the exact scale of disruption from the oil shock. For now, we know that we're talking about quarters and not months. And that in and of itself means that we expect growth downside risks to outweigh inflation upside risks.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen; and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson talks about risks in this late stage of the equity market pullback, how investors should position and what could come next.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist.
Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing what investors should be doing as we enter the final innings of this equity market correction.
It's Monday, April 6th at 11:30 am in New York.
So, let’s get after it.
For the past several months, my view has been very consistent. In short, I continue to believe we’re in a bull market that began last April, coming out of what I’ve described as a rolling recession between 2022 and 2025. That recovery remains intact despite recent threats from AI disruption, private credit and a new war in Iran while the war between Russia and Ukraine persists.
Markets have not been complacent with stocks correcting since last fall. In fact, it’s well advanced with the S&P 500’s forward price earnings multiple declining by 18 percent, a rare move outside of a recession or a Fed tightening cycle – neither of which is likely in my view.
Meanwhile, earnings growth isn’t rolling over. Instead, it’s accelerating to multi-year highs and that’s a key difference versus past periods when oil shocks led to a recession. And, in the absence of that outcome, I see a market that’s discounted a lot of bad news.
Beneath the surface, the damage has been even more significant with over half of stocks down at least 20 percent from their highs, and many down 30-40 percent. Resets of this scale usually occur near the end of corrections, not the beginning.
The S&P 500 bounced last week off the 6300 to 6500 range of support that I have been highlighting. Could we re-test those levels? Sure – especially if rates push higher or geopolitical risks escalate further. However, I don’t see a meaningful breakdown.
If anything, what’s still missing – and what I’d actually like to see – is a bit more de-risking in crowded trades like semiconductors and memory stocks, in particular. That kind of repositioning reset is often required to seal a durable bottom.
So, if we are in the later innings, the next question is: where do you want to be? For me, it’s about balance and I think the right approach is a barbell of cyclicals, and quality growth.
On the cyclical side, I like Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Industrials. These are the areas where earnings momentum remains strong and valuations have come down meaningfully. It’s also what was leading prior to the start of the Iran conflict and reflects our core view that we are still in the early stages of a recovery from the rolling recession. Last week’s jobs report supports that view with private payrolls increasing by [$]186 000, one of the largest rises in three years.
On the growth side, I’m focused on the hyperscalers as a very good risk reward at this point. These companies are trading at roughly the same multiple as defensive sectors like Staples, but with more than three times the earnings growth. Meanwhile the sentiment and positioning is as bad as it’s been since 2022’s bear market when these companies were showing negative earnings growth.
So, what could go wrong? The main risk to equities is still rates and central bank policy, not the war.
We know this because we just flipped back into a regime where stocks and yields are negatively correlated where higher rates put pressure on valuations. 4.5 percent on a 10-year Treasury bond continues to be a key threshold where stock valuations are likely to get worse before they rebound durably.
Furthermore, bond volatility and Fed expectations are driving tighter financial conditions—and that’s been the real source of market stress lately.
But here’s the irony: that tightening is also what ultimately sets up a more dovish pivot from the Fed and other central banks. If financial conditions tighten too much, the Fed has the flexibility to respond—and we have plenty of evidence that there’s willingness to do that over the past several years.
Bottom line? The market has already done a lot of the hard work. It has priced in geopolitical risk, private credit concerns and even negative side effects from AI, which is ultimately a productivity enhancing technology.
What we’re dealing with now is the final hurdle – policy, rates levels and volatility. And once we get through that, I think the path forward becomes a lot clearer.
But remember, markets don’t wait for certainty – they move ahead of it. You should, too.
Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

Our Chief Cross-Asset Strategist Serena Tang discusses why the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on oil prices could define the entire market cycle.
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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Serena Tang, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Cross-Asset Strategist. Today: how the latest energy shock is rippling across every major asset class.
It’s Thursday, April 2nd, at 10am in New York.
Right now, the markets aren’t just reacting to oil – they’re being shaped by it. The path of energy prices is quickly becoming the lens through which investors interpret everything else: growth, inflation, policy, and ultimately risk appetite. And depending on where oil settles, the market story could look very different from here.
The starting point is simple: the baseline for energy prices has shifted higher. If tensions ease, our Chief Commodities Strategist, Martijn Rats, expects oil to settle around $80 to $90 per barrel in 2026, quite a step up from what we saw in 2025. If constraints persist, that rises to $100 to $110 per barrel. And in a more extreme scenario – where supply disruptions intensify – oil can reach $150 to $180 per barrel.
Now, at those higher levels, the impact becomes nonlinear. Oil stops being just an inflation story and starts weighing directly on demand and growth. That’s why we see the current environment as binary: markets either revert to their pre-shock trajectory, or they begin pricing in a much tougher mix of tighter policy and weaker growth.
To make sense of this, we frame the outlook through three scenarios.
In a de-escalation scenario, supply disruptions ease quickly and oil stabilizes in that $80 to $90 per barrel range. Markets effectively breathe a sigh of relief. Investors refocus on growth drivers like earnings resilience and AI investment. And equities outperform, particularly cyclical sectors like consumer discretionary, financials, and industrials, while defensives lag. Bond yields fall, as inflation expectations decline. All in all, in plain terms, this is a classic risk-on environment.
The second scenario – ongoing constraints – is a little bit more complicated. Oil stays elevated around $100 to $110 per barrel. Markets can absorb that, we think, but it creates friction. Equities still perform, but with more volatility and less conviction. The S&P [500] is likely to move within a wide 6400 and 6850 range in the near term. Leadership shifts toward higher-quality companies – those with steadier earnings and stronger balance sheets – along with select defensives like healthcare. At the same time, credit markets start to really feel the strain with spreads widening in general under performance.
The third scenario – effective closure – is where the backdrop really changes. With oil above $150 per barrel, the focus shifts from inflation to growth risk. Investors will move into what we call a ‘recession playbook,’ dialing back equity exposure and increasing allocations to government bonds and cash. Defensive sectors like utilities, telecoms, and energy take the lead, as markets begin to price in a higher risk to the earnings cycle. Credit conditions tighten sharply, with high-yield spreads potentially widening materially.
What makes this environment especially challenging is how everything connects. In a typical cycle, bonds help offset equity losses. But in an oil shock, that relationship can break down because inflation is rising at the same time growth is slowing. That’s what we usually call a stagflationary setup, and it makes diversification harder just when investors need it most.
Currencies are reacting as well. In a more severe shock, the U.S. dollar strengthens, with EUR/USD potentially falling toward 1.13, while safe-haven currencies like the Swiss franc outperform. In a de-escalation scenario, EUR/USD could move back above 1.17 as risk sentiment improves.
Importantly, markets have adjusted over the past month. Equity valuations at one point was down about 15 percent on a forward price-to-earnings basis, suggesting in a large part of the risk was being priced in. At the same time, sentiment has improved from deeply negative levels, especially over the last few days, even as volatility remains closely tied to oil.
Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

As the Strait of Hormuz continues to be a chokepoint for oil, our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets and our Head of Commodity Research Martijn Rats discuss possible outcomes for the interconnected market.
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Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley.
Martijn Rats: I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley.
Andrew Sheets: And today in the program: Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain restricted. The implications for global energy markets and what may lie ahead.
It's Wednesday, April 1st at 2pm in London.
So, Martijn, it's great to sit down with you again. Three weeks ago, we were having this conversation; a conversation that was a little bit alarming about the scale of the disruption of the oil market with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and how that could have ripple effects through the global economy.
Three weeks later, oil is still not flowing. What is happening? And what has maybe surprised you? Or been in line with expectations over the last couple of weeks?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. Many things have been in line with expectations, in the sense that we're seeing the effects of the closure of the strait the earliest in regions that are physically the closest to the strait. So, we saw the first examples of physical shortages in, say, the west coast of India. Then we saw examples from the east coast of India From there on it's reverberated throughout Asia, where now governments have announced a whole host of. Effectively, energy demand, uh, management measures, uh, work from home, kids staying at home from school, um, cancellation of flights.
There are quite many through, through Asia Also in Asia, we're seeing the type of prices that you would expect with this situation. Bunker fuel for shipping, somewhere between $150 to $200 a barrel. Jet fuel over $200 a barrel. Naphta going into Japan; naphta normally trades well below the headline price of Brent. Now $130 a barrel, that's more than double what it was in February.
So, those things tell the story of this historic event. What has been surprising on the other end is how slow the reaction has been in many of the oil prices that we track the most. Like…
Andrew Sheets: The numbers people will see on the news. You know, it's $100 a barrel maybe as we're talking.
Martijn Rats: Yeah. It's strange to see jet fuel cargoes in Rotterdam more than $200 a barrel, but then the front month Brent future only trading at [$]100. That spread is historically wide and very surprising. But look, there are some reasons for it. The crude market had more buffers. There are a few other things. But how slow Brent futures have rallied? That has been somewhat surprising.
Andrew Sheets: But you know, from those other prices you mentioned, those prices in Asia, those prices in Rotterdam that are maybe higher than the numbers that people might see on the news or on a financial website. Is it fair to say that in your mind that's sending a signal that this is a market that really is being affected by this? And being affected maybe in a larger way than the headline oil price might suggest?
Martijn Rats: Oh, clearly. Look, the oil market is full with small price signals that tell the story of the underlying plumbing of the oil market. So, you can look at price differential. So, physically delivered cargoes versus financially traded futures. West African oil versus North Sea oil. Brazilian oil versus North Sea oil. Oil for immediate physical delivery versus the futures contract that trades a month out. And many of those spreads have rallied to all time highs. That is no exaggeration.
And so, in an underlying sense, the stress in the market is clearly there. It is just that in front of Brent futures, which is the world's preferred speculative instrument to express a financial view on oil. Yeah, there the impact has been slower to come. But you're now seeing a lot of Asian refineries bidding for crudes that are further away in the Atlantic basin.
So, demand is spreading to further away regions. And that should over time still put upward pressure on Brent.
Andrew Sheets: In our first conversation, you know, you had this great walkthrough of both just putting the scale of this disruption in the Strait of Hormuz into the global context. How many barrels we're talking about, how that's a share of the global market.
Maybe just might be helpful to revisit those numbers again. And also, some of the mitigation factors. You know, we talked about – well maybe we could release reserves, maybe some pipelines could be rerouted. Based on what you're currently seeing on the ground, what is this disruption looking like?
Martijn Rats: Yeah, so to put things in context, global oil consumption is a bit more than 100 million barrels a day. That number lives in a lot of people's heads. But if you look at the market that is critical for price formation, that's really the seaborne market. You can imagine that if, say you're in China, and you have a shortage. But there is a pipeline from Canada into the United States – that pipeline's not really going to help you.
What you need is a cargo that can be delivered to a port in Shanghai. So, the seaborne market is where prices are formed. That is roughly a 60 million barrel a day market, of which 20 million barrels a day flows through the Strait of Hormuz. So, for the relative market, the Strait of Hormuz is about a third. It's very, very large.
Now, out of that 20 million barrel a day that is, in principle, in scope, there is still a little bit of Iranian oil flowing through. That continues. They let their own cargo through. Then Saudi Arabia has the East-West pipeline. They can divert some oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. That's about 4 million barrels a day, incremental on top of the flow that already exist on that pipeline. The UAE has a pipeline that can divert half a million barrel a day.
But you are still left with a problem that is in the order of 14-ish million barrels a day. You're going to have some SPR releases to offset that a little bit. But global SPRs can flow maybe 1 to 2 million barrels a day. You're very quickly left with a double digit shortage – and that is historically large…
Andrew Sheets: And just to take it to history, I mean, again, if we were placing a 14 million barrel a day disruption in the context of some of these historical oil disruptions that people might have a memory of – what is the relative scale?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. This is at the heart of why this is such a difficult period to manage. Like, normally we care about imbalances of 0.5 to 1 million. That gets interesting for oil analysts. At a million, you can expect prices to move. If you have dislocations in supply and amount of, say, 2 to 3 million barrels a day, you have historically epic moves that we talk about for decades, literally.
Like in 2008, oil fell from $130 a barrel to [$]30 on the basis of two to three quarters of 2 million barrel a day oversupply. In 2022, around the Ukraine invasion, oil went from 60-70 bucks to something like [$]130 at the peak on the basis of the expectation, but not realized. This was just an expectation that Russia would lose 3 million barrels a day of productive capacity. And so, 2 to 3 million barrels a day normally already gets us to these outsized moves. And so, this event is four, five times larger than that. That means we don't have historical reference for what's currently happening.
Andrew Sheets: I guess I'd like to now focus on the future and maybe I'll ask you to summarize two highly complex scenarios in a[n] overly simplified way. But let's say tonight we get an announcement that hostilities have ceased, that the strait is open, that oil can flow again. Or a second scenario where it's another three weeks from now, we're having this conversation again, and the strait is still closed. Could you just kind of help listeners understand what the energy market could look like under each of those scenarios?
Martijn Rats: Yeah. So maybe to start off with the latter one. Because from an analytical perspective, that one is perhaps a bit easier. Look, if the Strait stays closed, at some point, consumption needs to decline.
Andrew Sheets: Significantly.
Martijn Rats: Yeah, significantly. We need demand destruction. Now that's easier said than done. Who gets to consume in those type of environments – are those who are willing to pay the most. And that means that certain consumers need to be priced out of the market.
We tried to answer this question in 2022, and the collective answer that we all came up with is that you need prices for Brent – in money of the day – $150 or something thereabouts. That is not an exaggeration. Now, let's all hope we can avoid that scenario because that is… You know, that looks like a spectacular price. But that is not a beneficial scenario for anybody in the economy.
The other scenario is more interesting, and it can actually be split in sort of two sub scenarios…
Andrew Sheets: And this is the scenario where actually stuff starts flowing tomorrow.
Martijn Rats: Exactly, exactly. If it completely flows like it always did – sure, we go back to the situation we had before these events. Brent can fall substantially – 70 bucks. Before these events we thought the oil market would be oversupplied. Who knows? True freedom of navigation may be even lower. But, at the moment, that doesn't quite look like that will be the scenario that's in front of us.
What seems to be emerging is an outcome whereby this could deescalate but leave the Iranian regime structurally in control of the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. And if the Iranian regime continues to manage the flow as they currently do – cargo by cargo. Because there are some cargoes trickling out and there is a process that seems to be established for it. There seems to be a toll that seems to be paid. And if it remains that sort of relatively heavy handed -- This cargo goes, that cargo doesn't.
Given that that will then manage 20 percent of global oil supply, that is not the same oil market that we had before. Like all of OPEC spare capacity would be behind this system. Would that spare capacity be available in the case of an emergency? Maybe, maybe not. This is only one of many questions. But if the Iranians stay in control of the strait, we will not return to the oil market that we once knew.
Andrew Sheets: And is that fair to say we might need a higher, long-term oil price? A higher risk premium in future oil prices to offset some of that?
Martijn Rats: Yes. I would say that that is very likely. First, a lot of the supply would be fundamentally less reliable. Second, we would have de minimis effective spare capacity in the system. Thirdly, if this is the scenario we are left with, that creates an enormous incentive for countries to start expanding their strategic storages. And building strategic inventories is like exerting demand. China has built a lot of strategic storage over the last two years. They are now in a better shape than if they hadn't. In the west, we've historically had strategic storage. But India for example, has none. And so, the rest of Southeast Asia, no strategic storage; a lot of strategic storage buying that will is price supportive.
And also, look, the prices that we care about are the price of Brent and WTI, and they are not behind the Strait of Hormuz. They have higher security of delivery. You can totally see how refineries would be willing to pay premium for those crudes relative to others. So, when you add all of that up, it leaves you with a higher risk premium. That people would pay particularly for the crudes that form our perceptions about the oil market,
Andrew Sheets: Martijn, one final question I'd love to ask you about is how the U.S. fits into all of this. You know, you do encounter this perception that the U.S. is energy independent. It produces a lot of oil. It's net energy neutral in terms of its imports-exports. You can correct me to the extent that's correct.
But to what extent do you think it's true that the U.S. is more isolated energy wise from what's going on? And to what extent do you think that that could be a little bit misleading given a global interconnected market?
Martijn Rats: Look, the United States is in a better position than many other countries, that's for sure. China, it's a very large importer of oil Europe, very large importer of oil, uh, and at least the United States has, has a much bigger base of its own production. Um, But the practical reality is also that that is, I would just say, mostly sort of a volume argument, but not a price argument. The United States is a net exporter of oil. But that is a net effect after very large imports and very large exports. It's just that the exports are a little bit bigger than the imports…
Andrew Sheets: So, it's a lot of flow in both directions…
Martijn Rats: There is an enormous flow in both directions and that connects the United States with the rest of the world. In the end, in the seaborne market, there really is only one oil price and we all pay it, including the United States. But nevertheless, relative to other parts of the world, yeah, better positioned,
Andrew Sheets: But still not immune from what’s going on.
Martijn Rats: No, no. We're all connected.
Andrew Sheets: Martin, it's been wonderful talking with you and while I hope to catch up with you again soon, if we're not talking again in three weeks, it maybe is a good sign.
Martijn Rats: Might be. Thank you, Andrew.
Andrew Sheets: And thank you, as always, for your time. If you find Thoughts on the Market useful, let us know by leaving a review wherever you listen. And also, tell a friend or colleague about us today.

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur and Morgan Stanley Investment Management’s Global Head of Private Credit & Equity David Miller discuss the recent pressure on the private credit market, potential risks and opportunities that remain in that space.
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Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist.
David Miller: And I'm David Miller, Global Head of Private Credit and Equity within Morgan Stanley Investment Management.
Vishy Tirupattur: Today – the evolving risks and opportunities in private credit.
It's Tuesday, March 31st at 10 am In New York.
Until recently, private credit was among the fast-growing parts of the financial system. In just over a decade, it went from a niche strategy to a market that's well worth over a trillion dollars. After years of outsized inflows and unusually smooth return, private credit is now in focus, and investors are asking tough questions about liquidity, transparency, and valuation.
David, you manage private credit and equity portfolios within Morgan Stanley Investment Management. Do you think the industry is facing its first real stress test? And how do you think the industry is faring?
David Miller: So, I think private credit has been tested before, you could go back to the GFC. And I know that was a long time ago and the industry was quite a bit smaller. But you could certainly look to the pandemic and the rate shocks of [20]22 - [20]23 as a stress test. And I think private credit performed, you know, quite well through that, despite the initial volatility. We saw some of that recently last year with Liberation Day; and the current environment from a fundamental perspective doesn't feel as bad as those times, and the industry does not feel under that stress.
I think the current situation is more of a test of the non-traded BDC structure where roughly 20 percent of direct lending assets sit. And the liquidity provisions in those vehicles are designed to provide some liquidity, but not total liquidity. And so, while I think the vehicles are working as intended, obviously there's been a lot of noise.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, I totally agree with you, David. The liquidity provisions that are in these structures are there for a reason; are designed to be that. It’s part of the feature and not a bug, precisely to prevent a fire sale of assets. And that really would hurt the overall system. So, we think that there’s a greater understanding of this is very much required.
David Miller: I think that's right. The limitations on liquidity are there so that the vehicles can operate properly over the long run. When you have illiquid assets, you maintain some liquidity. But clearly those protections are in place so that the vehicle continue to run in ordinary fashion.
I think there is a bit of a disconnect, you know, in the media between the sentiment and the fundamentals that are underlying private credit. And yeah, there are concerns about software, and macro, and unseen future risks. But right now, private credit portfolios are performing pretty well. And actually, if you look at 2025 versus [20]24, the metrics were actually improving…
Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. I mean, we look at across various metrics, you know, in leverage and coverage metrics, we see overall trends are actually improving. Software [is] very much in focus. Fitch reported, yesterday that, uh, in the last, uh, you know, year to date there have been no software defaults. Another point I would make is there are about 5 percent defaults in – generally speaking – in the private credit space. And the default rates within the software sector is a little bit less than half of that.
So, that's an important distinction to make.
David Miller: Yeah, I think software is a very interesting and long topic. But generally, our view is: we think that AI is going to be a net tailwind overall for software over time. You know, even factoring in some of the erosion to the SaaS business models, I think well positioned incumbents will get their share of the upside. And so there will be some losers. We think that'll be pretty narrow. But overall, we feel very good about our software book.
We've been looking at AI risk for at least three years, when we made loans. And we think that a lot of the embedded enterprise software platforms are going to be net beneficiaries of AI.
Vishy Tirupattur: I have slightly different take on the software exposure and all the discussion points on this. The way I think about it is the market assumption is that AI disruption is necessarily going to disrupt all of software companies. And that disruption is imminent. I would push back on both of those points.
You know, you could easily imagine that AI will lead to some disruption at some point in the future. But a necessary thing for that to happen is a significant amount of CapEx related to infrastructure to enable AI from innovation to adoption that needs to take place. That will take some time.
So, this potential disruption is not imminent. It's potentially coming in the future. But all in, disruption is also not going to be negative. You know, we will have some companies whose business models, who don't have the moats and may not be able to benefit. But on the other hand, as you point out, there will be a number of business models which will actually flourish because of AI adoption and see their margins expand.
So, I think I would push back on this notion that's prevalent in the media narrative here. That all AI disruption is imminent and it is all bad.
David Miller: I think that's a very good point, and we do believe that there will be dispersion and outcome in private credit portfolios because of some of those facts. And it's really important for managers to have deep experience, not just in software, but any industries that they participate in. And really do very strong credit selection.
Vishy Tirupattur: So, another thing that's happening in the private credit space is really the advent of the retail investor into the private credit. What do you think the advent of retail investors had done to the portfolio selection, portfolio construction and credit selection in your portfolios?
David Miller: So, for us, we haven't changed our portfolio construction or credit selection process for retail portfolios. They're virtually the same as our institutional portfolios. And that's, you know, based on a lot of diversification, limiting borrower concentration, avoiding cyclicals, et cetera.
The one difference that's important for our non-traded BDC is we do have about 10 percent of the portfolio in broadly syndicated loans, to add a little bit more liquidity to the portfolio. But otherwise, they're pretty much the same.
I think the biggest impact that we've witnessed over the past few years, where there's been a large inflow of retail capital, has been to push spreads tighter. And weaken some of the terms than they would've otherwise been. There was a lot of capital that needed to be deployed quickly, so we saw that and we're quite cautious. You're seeing that trend reverse now as flows have moderated, and we expect that those trends will result in better pricing and better terms going forward.
So, Vishy, how are you thinking about risk in the system now? Are you seeing signs of systemic risk? Or is the pressure more isolated?
Vishy Tirupattur: I think the pressure is really more isolated, more focused on the software sector. As we just discussed, it will take time to figure out the winners and losers coming out of this. But that process is really; we think will result in some pickup in default rates. But we think it'll be very concentrated within the software sector.
So, when I look back at the systemic risks, the echoes of the financial crisis of 2008 come back, you know. We both have gone through that in different roles, you know. I used to be tall and good looking is before the financial crisis. So, the scars of financial crisis are clearly on upon me now.
But I compare these two time periods – and I say in any metric, the risks in the system today are nowhere comparable to the kind of systemic risk that existed back then. You look at the risks, the leverage at the company level. You look at the leverage; the vehicles where credit risk is sitting. Look at the risks and the leverage within the banking system. And the links of the non-banks to banks. All of them put together make us think that the systemic risks are very, very contained. And any allusion to that ‘We are back in 2008,’ I would very strongly push back against that illusion.
So, David, let me ask you one final question here. If we had to highlight one risk or one opportunity in private credit for investors over the next year, what would it be?
David Miller: I think the headlines have covered most of the risks, so I'll go with an opportunity.
So, we believe spreads on private credit loans have widened quite a bit for direct lending. Both for non-software and software names. So, for investors looking to deploy new capital or investors who are underweight their target allocations, we think it's an interesting time. But we believe there's also a really nice opportunity in opportunistic or hybrid private credit.
And that's coming from borrowers who need more flexible solutions, and that can come from M&A activity, non-dilutive growth capital. Or balance sheet rationalizations where one can inject junior capital to good businesses that have over-levered balance sheets. And you can get paid well for the flexibility and the optionality that's providing equity holders. There's been far less capital raised for these types of opportunities over the last few years, and they're pretty favorable dynamics going forward as demand increases.
Vishy Tirupattur: That's very insightful. David, thanks for taking the time to talk.
David Miller: Great speaking with you, Vishy.
Vishy Tirupattur: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

David Miller is not a member of Morgan Stanley’s Research department. Unless otherwise indicated, his views are his own and may differ from the views of the Morgan Stanley Research department and from the views of others within Morgan Stanley.